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PROGRAM OF EVENTS
TUESDAY, 25 JUNE
0815 Transportation departs Hotel for U.S. Naval War College
0830 Workshop Registration and Breakfast – Mahan Rotunda
0900 Introduction – Mahan Reading Room
Working Group Agenda and Goals
Dr. Andrea J. Dew, U.S. Naval War College
Opening remarks and Speaker Introductions
Prof. David Brown, U.S. Naval War College
0930 Case Study Proposal 1
The Sea Tigers as a Model of Maritime Insurgency: How New? How Common? How Different?
Prof. Geoffrey Till, U.S. Naval War College
1045 Break
1100 Case Study Proposal 2
The Development of Doctrine to Address Operational Challenges Associated with Unmanned
Maritime Systems
CAPT Andrew J. Norris, USCG (Ret.), Tradewind Maritime Service
1200 Luncheon – Mahan Reading Room
1300 Case Study Proposal 3
The Russian Maritime Arctic: A Region of Great Change in the 21st Century
Dr. Lawson W. Brigham, Wilson Center & University of Alaska, Fairbanks
1400 Break
1415 Case Study Proposal 4
Sea Shepherd – A Non-State Navy Responding to a Global Challenge: The Evolution of Sea
Shepherd from Environmental Activist/Outlaw to Legitimized Maritime Security Partner in
Capacity Building
Dr. Claude Berube, U.S. Naval Academy
1515 Final Remarks
1530 Transportation to Hotel
1745 Transportation departs Hotel for Officers’ Club
1800 Workshop Dinner – Officers’ Club, Naval Station Newport
2100 Transportation returns to Hotel
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WEDNESDAY, 26 JUNE
0815 Transportation departs Hotel for U.S. Naval War College
0830 Breakfast – Mahan Rotunda
0900 Case Study Proposal 5
Irregular Warfare in the Arctic Islands: Past and Future
Dr. Rebecca Pincus, U.S. Naval War College
1000 Break
1015 Case Study Proposal 6
Countering Coercion in the South China Sea: The Role of Strategic Culture
Kerry Lynn Nankivell, Public Safety Canada & PhD Candidate, King’s College London
1115 Lunch – Mahan Rotunda
1215 Case Study Proposal 7
Hybrid Maritime Warfare
Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr., University of Copenhagen
1315 Break
1330 Case Study Proposal 8
Testing the Limits of Seapower: Islands, Insurgents, and Interaction
Dr. Timothy D. Hoyt, U.S. Naval War College
1430 Concluding Remarks
Transportation departs for Hotel and T.F. Green Airport / Kingston Train Station

2 | Maritime Irregular Warfare Workshop

ABOUT THE CENTER ON IRREGULAR WARFARE AND ARMED GROUPS
The Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) is dedicated to the interdisciplinary
study of the challenges presented by irregular warfare (IW) and non-state actors, also known as armed
groups, in the 21st century. Additionally, CIWAG facilitates interaction and collaboration between
professional military educational institutions, civilian academics and battlefield practitioners.
The mission of the CIWAG is fourfold:
1. Promote and support research and teaching on irregular warfare and armed groups;
2. Facilitate interaction and collaboration between professional military educational institutions,
civilian academics and battlefield practitioners;
3. Disseminate current analysis via symposia and workshops to provide a forum for dialogue at
the Naval War College between U.S. and international practitioners and scholars;
4. Expand outreach and networking activities to establish and sustain a community of interest
devoted to the study and teaching of irregular warfare and armed groups as well as create
case studies.
The operational objectives for the CIWAG are:
1. Promoting collaborative research among scholars and practitioners resulting in panel
presentations at major conferences, workshops and seminars as well as published research;
2. Expanding the institutions represented at CIWAG workshops and symposia in order to improve
the quality of research and exchange on the issue of irregular warfare and armed groups;
3. Fostering collaboration and increasing institutional ties between civilian and professional
military educational institutions, and between U.S. and international academics and practitioners.
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ACTING PRESIDENT, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
LEWIS M. DUNCAN, PHD
Lewis M. Duncan currently serves as Acting President of the U.S. Naval War College,
the preeminent advanced military education school in the world. As Provost, Dr.
Duncan serves as the College’s chief operating officer, overseeing the continuum of
professional military education programs, residential and online, as well as
operational administration of the institution.
Dr. Duncan is internationally recognized as an accomplished research scientist in experimental
space physics and radiophysics, and as a leading scholar in study of the societal and ethical
implications of emerging technologies.
Additionally, he serves on the Board of Directors of the Center for the Advancement of Science in
Space, responsible for management of the U.S. National Laboratory of the International Space Station.
He also is an Associated Fellow of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, supporting
the United Nations Operational Satellite Applications Technology (UNOSAT) program.
Previously, Dr. Duncan served for ten years as President of Rollins College. He also served as Dean
of the Thayer School of Engineering and Professor of Engineering Sciences at Dartmouth College.
Dr. Duncan received his BA (1973) in physics and mathematics, MA (1976) and PhD (1977) in
space physics, all from Rice University. Among his past honors, he received the Alan Berman Award
from U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, Tau Beta Pi, and
Phi Kappa Phi.

DEAN OF ACADEMICS, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

PHIL HAUN, COL, USAF (RET.), PHD
phil.haun@usnwc.edu
Phil Haun has been the Dean of Academics and a Professor at the U.S. Naval War
College since 2016. He previously served in the U.S. Air Force as an officer and A10 pilot with combat tours in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. His last
assignment was as Commander of AFROTC at Yale University. Phil’s military
education includes National Security Fellow at the JFK School of Government,
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air Command and Staff College, and
USAF Weapons School. His areas of scholarly and professional expertise are coercion, deterrence, air
power theory, strategy, international relations, and security studies. Phil holds a Ph.D. in Political
Science/International Relations from MIT, a master’s degree in Economics from Vanderbilt, and a
bachelor’s degree in Engineering Studies from Harvard. He taught Economics at the Air Force
Academy, Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Military History and Grand Strategy
at Yale University. For the past decade he has been a research affiliate with MIT’s Security Studies
Program. His books include Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing
in World War II (UP Kentucky, 2019), Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United
States (Stanford UP, 2015) and A-10s over Kosovo (Air University Press, 2003). His latest article with
the Journal of Strategic Studies is “Peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation:
The unique case of the U.S. Air Force and Battlefield Air Interdiction.”
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CENTER ON IRREGULAR WARFARE AND ARMED GROUPS
ANDREA J. DEW, PHD

andrea.dew@usnwc.edu

Andrea J. Dew is an associate professor of Strategy and Policy and also holds the
Chair of Maritime Irregular Warfare Forces at the U.S. Naval War College. She lived
in Japan for eight years where she studied advanced Japanese at the Kyoto Japanese
Language School. Professor Dew has served as a research fellow at the Belfer
Center for Science in International Affairs at Harvard University, and senior
counter-terrorism fellow at the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School.
Dr. Dew is the founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups at the U.S.
Naval War College.
DAVID BROWN, COL, USA (RET.)

david.brown@usnwc.edu

David Brown is the executive director of the Advanced Strategist Program (ASP) at
the Naval War College. A former designated Army Strategist, he holds a BA in
Philosophy, a diploma for studies in the Greek language, a diploma from the Army’s
Command and General Staff College, a MMAS from the Army’s School of Advanced
Military Studies Program, a MS from Long Island University in Counseling and
Leader Development, and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.
COL Brown’s career spanned over 30 years in combat arms units and a variety of command and staff
positions in the United States and overseas. His operational experience includes nuclear weapons
programs, combat experience in Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, and operational planning
experience at Battalion, Brigade, Division and Theater levels to include operations in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Iraq. In 2008 he served as the senior military advisor for the 2nd Iraqi Army Division in Mosul.
Professor Brown also taught for seven years in the Naval War College’s Strategy & Policy Department,
and is the co-director of the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups.
LOUIS MCCRAY, CAPT, USN

louis.mccray@usnwc.edu

Louis McCray joined the Joint Military Operations Department as a military
professor in the fall of 2017, and he is the U.S. Naval War College special operations
chair and the deputy director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed
Groups. He is a naval special warfare officer and has served in a variety of billets in
both the SEAL community and at joint commands. He has made multiple
deployments to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, as well as
throughout Europe and the Pacific.
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PARTICIPANTS
CLAUDE BERUBE, PHD
berube@usna.edu
Claude Berube has published five books and more than 40 articles. He is a past Chair
of the Editorial Board of Naval Institute Proceedings. As a defense contractor, he
worked for Naval Sea Systems Command and the Office of Naval Research. He also
worked for two Senators on Capitol Hill and as a civilian at the Office of Naval
Intelligence. Since 2005, he taught in the Political Science Department at the U.S.
Naval Academy and in the History Department for the past seven years while serving
as the Director of the Naval Academy Museum. He was a LEGIS Fellow with the Brookings Institution
and a Maritime Security Studies Fellow with The Heritage Foundation.
LAWSON W. BRIGHAM, CAPT, USCG (RET.), PHD
lwb48@aol.com
Lawson W. Brigham is a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars (The Wilson Center) in Washington DC and a researcher at the
International Arctic Research Center, University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF). He is
also a Fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy,
and a member of the National Academies Polar Research Board. Captain Brigham
was a career Coast Guard officer and commanded four cutters including the icebreaker Polar Sea on
Arctic and Antarctic voyages; he also served as the Coast Guard’s Chief of Strategic Planning. During
2004-09 he was chair of the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment and Vice Chair of the
Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group. Dr. Brigham has been a Marine
Policy Fellow at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution; a faculty member of the U.S. Coast Guard
Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, and UAF as Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy; and, Alaska
Director of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission. He is a graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, a
U.S. Naval War College distinguished graduate, and holds graduate degrees from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute (MS) and Cambridge University (MPhil & PhD). His research interests have
focused on the Russian maritime Arctic, environmental change, polar marine transportation &
logistics, Arctic security, and polar geopolitics. Dr. Brigham is a Council of Foreign Relations member,
was elected to the Norwegian Scientific Academy for Polar Research (2013), and awarded the
American Polar Society’s Polar Medal (2015). A central peak in Victoria Land, Antarctica was named
Mount Brigham in January 2008 by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.
TIMOTHY D. HOYT, PHD

hoytt@usnwc.edu

Timothy D. Hoyt is a Professor of Strategy and Policy, the John Nicholas Brown
Chair of Counterterrorism, and Acting Director of the Advanced Strategy Program
at the U.S. Naval War College, where he has taught for 17 years. His research
focuses on irregular warfare and terrorism, the defense policies and strategies of
middle powers, warfare in the developing world, and a regional focus on South Asia
and the Middle East.
KERRY LYNN NANKIVELL

Kerry Lynn Nankivell has been working in the security and defense community
for over 15 years and specializes in maritime security in the Asia Pacific. This
includes naval modernization, coast guard dynamics, blue economy, and maritime
disputes, in waters ranging from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Her
work has been published in Foreign Policy, Asia Policy, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Pacific Defense Forum, The Diplomat, and the National
Bureau of Asian Research. Her edited volume, Chinese-Japanese Competition in the East Asian
Regional Security Complex was released in 2017.
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ANDREW J. NORRIS, CAPT, USCG (RET.)

anorris@tradewindmaritimeservices.com

Andrew Norris currently works as a maritime legal and regulatory consultant.
Retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years of active service in 2016. He also served
as a surface line officer in the U.S. Navy from 1985-1989, during which he deployed
aboard USS Kidd (DDG-993) to the Persian Gulf in 1987 during Operation Earnest
Will. Career highlight include serving as a visiting professor of maritime policy at
the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, as the Robert J. Papp Jr. Professor of Maritime
Security at the U.S. Naval War College, as the Staff Judge Advocate for the Fourteenth Coast Guard
District, and as a judge on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals.
REBECCA PINCUS, PHD

rebecca.pincus@usnwc.edu

Rebecca Pincus is an Assistant Professor of Strategic and Operational Research
Department (SORD) in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War
College, and a member of the Institute for Future Warfare Studies within SORD. She
previously served as primary investigator (PI) at the U.S. Coast Guard’s Center for
Arctic Study and Policy, located at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy
GARY SCHAUB, JR., PHD

gs@ifs.ku.dk

Gary Schaub is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies, Department of
Political Science, University of Copenhagen. He previously has been a consultant to
the Institute for Defense Analyses, an Assistant Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Air
War College, a Research Fellow at the U.S. Air Force Research Institute, a Visiting
Assistant Professor at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a
Researcher at the Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and
an Adjunct Instructor of History at Chatham College. He earned his Doctorate in Public and
International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh, his Master of Arts from the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, and his Bachelor of Science from Carnegie Mellon University.
GEOFFREY TILL, PHD

geoffrey.till.UK@usnwc.edu

Geoffrey Till is a Professor of Maritime Historical Research and holds the Dudley W.
Knox Chair for Naval History and Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island. Once Dean of Academic Studies at the UK Joint Services Command
and Staff College, Geoffrey Till is also Emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies at
King’s College London and Chairman of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy
Studies. Since 2009 he has also been a Visiting Professor and Senior Research
Fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. The author of over 200 articles
and book chapters, his Understanding Victory: Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the Falklands
appeared in 2014 and the fourth revised edition of Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century in 2018.
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 1
The Sea Tigers as a Model of Irregular Operations at Sea: How New? How
Common? How Different? — Two case studies compared
Geoffrey Till, PhD
U.S. Naval War College
Summary
As long as there has been regular or conventional methods of conducting conflicts at sea, weaker
actors, and often even powerful ones, have sought to evade the high political and physical costs these
conflicts can incur by resorting to irregular or unconventional methods of securing their objectives
by actions at sea. The actors in question are often nation states acting unconventionally in order to
achieve their aims in the most cost-effective way. Resorting to the widespread use of privateers was
a common device, for example. Privateering, or the issue of “letters of marque” to ship captains whose
modus operandi approximated to piracy that just happened to be targeted against the country’s
adversaries, provided the state with a cost-effective means of damaging its adversary’s war economy,
while enriching its own economy at minimal outlay in terms of investment in military people and
equipment. The ambiguous status of privateers and the known uncertainties of central control over
such free spirits also provided a diplomatically useful degree of plausible deniability—as Philip II of
Spain was only too aware of in his frustrated dealings with his notionally much weaker adversary,
England’s Queen Elizabeth I.
The English approach, especially in the earlier days of Elizabeth’s reign, was shaped by a lively
awareness of the apparent strength and reputation of the Spanish army (especially when compared to
the meagre military resources that the Queen could command) and the extreme limits of the country’s
war budget.1 Accordingly, the strategic aim was to secure as much advantage as possible while avoiding
a full-scale war with Philip II. The apparent “fuzziness” of the operational and tactical means by which
Elizabeth sought to secure her aims was ideally suited for this broader higher purpose.
Sometimes, though, Philip was also up against nonstate actors (or at most proto-state actors) such
as the Dutch “Sea Beggars.” Not having access to facilities that could build conventional warships,
these rebels against Spanish rule resorted to the use of small, nimbler craft, able to take on the
apparently much more powerful Spanish galleons, especially when at anchor or becalmed. Much
more feared though were the insurgents’ “fireships” —the “Antwerp Hellburners” —which proved so
effective against Spanish warships in the narrow waters of the English Channel that the Royal Navy
adopted them as a decisive battle-winning tactic against the Spanish armada in 1588. Fireships
became an aspect of conventional naval operations for most of the rest of the Age of Sail.
The nature and status of the protagonists, both state and nonstate, and of the methods they
employed (especially in actions in the grey zone between peace and war) shrouded these activities in
a level of ambiguity that was strategically useful to determined actors when taking on much more
powerful adversaries. Their overall aim was to exploit particular vulnerabilities of those adversaries
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The English were well aware, for example, that the
potential Achilles heel of Spain, the superpower of the day, was its absolute reliance on bullion
imported from Central and South America, and they devised a strategy that made the most of their
victim’s strategic dependency. Similarly the Sea Beggars aimed to exploit the tactical vulnerability of
powerful galleons at anchor or huddled against the sandbanks of the English Channel. This was

1 In fact modern historiography has

shown that there was a good deal of “smoke and mirrors” in Spanish power,
especially at sea, but at the time this was not how it seemed to Spain’s adversaries.
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“manouevrist” in approach, less in terms of tactically outflanking their adversary, although that was
certainly part, than in outsmarting it conceptually at the operational and strategic levels.
Given this long tradition of irregular and nonconventional operations at sea, some obvious
questions arise. What, if anything, is new and distinctive about contemporary examples of irregular
warfare at sea? In fact, examples of this kind of thing are so common as almost to make the “irregular”
seem “regular”! To what extent are they distinctive, and to what extent are the qualities required to
respond to them different to those needed, if not enjoyed, by the Spanish over 400 years ago? A
further question arises: Is there anything distinctive about such “irregular” operations when they are
conducted in the maritime domain?
This paper will seek to address these questions, first by teasing out some of the key characteristics
of irregular warfare, and second by an exercise in contrast and comparison. It will examine two
notable but very different examples of such operations at sea: the struggle conducted by a number of
Jewish groups to defeat British restrictions on migration to Palestine in the late 1940s, and the
maritime aspects of the long campaign of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against the
government of Sri Lanka (1983-2009). Hopefully this will reveal the extent to which one can
reasonably generalize about the novelty or nature of irregular operations at sea. Finally, the paper
will consider whether other useful generalizations can be made about the responses of conventional
forces to such challenges.
Five Common Characteristics of Irregular Operations
1. Irregular operations are often a feature of “violent peace” or the grey area between
peace and war.
2. They usually pit the apparently weak against the apparently strong.
3. The battle of the narrative is particularly important.
4. Success in irregular operations requires a comprehensive approach.
5. The stronger party may adopt (or adapt to) the tactics of the weak.
Applying These Characteristics to Two Case Studies
[Long paper to provide short but necessary background to the Palestine Patrol2 and the campaign by
and against the LTTE3]
1. Grey Area Operations. Neither side in the Palestine Patrol wished to resort to outright
conventional force, the Jewish authorities because they knew they would lose, the British because
they were fearful of the military and especially political costs that would incur. As far as the former
were concerned, the objective was seen as contributing to a viable and independent Israel and so
essentially of existential importance. The British had many other things to worry about and did not
attach the same level of importance to the outcome. In Sri Lanka, the matter was existential for both
sides, which explains why both the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and the Sea Tigers (ST) were willing to
accept the costs of ferocious and lethal conflict.
2. The Weak Versus the Strong. In both cases, this was how the situation was purveyed by the
weaker side, accurately in the case of the Palestine Patrol, although it put considerable strain on a
war-exhausted Royal Navy that had many other commitments to perform. On paper at least, the
British could easily have deterred further illegal immigration by sinking a few ships, but this was

2 Sources for this include David Holly, Exodus, (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995; Ninian Stewart, The
Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol (London: Frank Cass, 2002) and Freddy Liebreich, Britian’s naval and
political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine 1945-49, (London: routledge, 2004).
3 Sources include Jayanath Colombage, Asymmetric Warfare at Sea (Saarbrucken, Germany: Lambert Oublishing,
2015) and discussions and interveiews with the Sri Lankan Navy
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obviously not a politically acceptable option. In this case, the advantage in perceived strength at sea
was relevant only to the extent that it could be applied.
In the early days of the ST operation, the reality was different than it appeared at first glance. At
that time, the insurgents were more numerous and better equipped than their naval adversaries. By
adopting insurgent weaponry and methods, however, the SLN with the full resources of the state at
its disposal at first equaled and then surpassed the ST, eventually confirming the perception
commonly held at the start of the conflict.
3. The Battle of the Narratives. By emphasizing the extent to which the refugees were innocent
men, women, and children fleeing from the raw horrors of World War II, Jewish groups were easily
able to present themselves as victimized by brutal British naval professionals. This narrative played
especially well in the U.S., a country which for other reasons of high strategy the UK was anxious to
retain as a guarantor superpower ally.
In the Sri Lankan case, the ST needed to solicit continuing support from the Tamil diaspora, while
the Sri Lankan government was concerned about the manifest disapproval of their methods, especially
in Europe. But while the battle for narratives was important to both sides in this conflict, it was less
central to both their concerns. The main focus in the Sri Lankan case was to seek to undermine the will
of the opposing force, rather than to appeal to bystanders. Sinking the adversary’s vessels and killing
its people was at once a military act and a powerful message of capability and resolve.
For the SLN, however, there was the burdensome requirement to distinguish its adversaries from
innocent Indian/Tamil fishermen. The ST made the most of this problem by using these fishermen as
cover, pretending to be them and even taking children with them as a form of disguise; for the SLN it
was imperative not to make damaging mistakes, especially given the high probability that it would be
caught doing so. However, the conditions characteristic of the murky world of irregular operations,
at sea as on land, made the full monitoring and observance of many aspects of humanitarian law much
more difficult. There remains intense and damaging controversy over the extent of, and responsibility
for, numerous gross violations of humanitarian law and the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity allegedly by both the SL military and the LTTE, especially in the closing stages of
the conflict and almost exclusively ashore that as yet remain unresolved.4
In the case of the Palestine patrol, the British in the conduct of their boarding operations were
able largely to avoid such accusations, but their crucial use of the legal concept of refoullement (under
which ships and/or their passengers could legitimately be returned to their port of origin) became a
much debated issue of legal and political contention.
4. The Comprehensive Approach. For both sides in the Palestinian case, the importance of such
legal controversies showed that the conduct of their competing campaigns at sea was just a part of
their broader policies towards the creation of Israel. The Jewish groups, however, relied heavily on
the support of the diaspora, especially in the United States, in the acquisition, equipment, and
operation of the shipping they needed and in the tacit support of the European countries from which
those ships departed. Ensuring all this required an integrated grand strategy and attempting to
counter at least parts of it was a major preoccupation of the British side.
The LTTE likewise depended heavily on the Tamil diaspora and on various interest groups in
Tamil Nadu in southern India for the supply shipping and military equipment that supported their
land campaign and their naval forces. Early on in their campaign, the SLN discovered a need for major
naval reinvestment, but there were few countries able or willing to provide the equipment needed,
with the exception of Israel and Singapore. The Sri Lankan government had also to be acutely mindful
of the attitudes of the Indian government, which was initially helpful but later more distant. Their
actions at sea has therefore to be seen against a much broader set of policies by both protagonists.

Steven R. Ratner ‘Accountability and the Sri Lankan Civil war’ American Journal of International Law, Vol 106,
Issue 4, Oct 2017, pp 795-808.
4
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5. Substantial Military Adaptation. On the refugee ships en route to Palestine, when British
boarding threatened, the passengers resorted to physical resistance. This was often quite risky but
generally stopped short of inflicting lethal costs on British boarding parties. Well aware of the political
and propaganda costs of apparently disproportionate responses, the British acted with restraint,
although there were a few lapses resulting in the inadvertent deaths of four or five people over the
period of the campaign. In some cases, the British were concerned that the risks to life and limb would
be greater if they did not intervene, as in the case of ships that seemed to be grossly overloaded and
fundamentally unseaworthy, especially if allowed to try to run themselves ashore on the Palestinian
coast. To cope, the Royal Navy resorted to special training run by the Royal Marines in Malta,
specifically modelled on the methods of resistance adopted by the immigrants. This and the restraint
shown by both sides kept the costs of this campaign surprisingly low and overall relations between
them surprisingly good.
It was otherwise in the Sri Lankan case, where the acquisition of more appropriate small attack
craft, accumulated expertise in the identification and prosecution of the ST boats, and the adoption
of insurgent methods in the formation and operation of the Rapid Action Boat Squadrons allowed the
SLN to seize the initiative, destroy their adversary’s attack fleet, and sink their supply shipping. In
effect the insurgent “swarms” were “outswarmed.”
In terms of the extent to which we can reasonably generalize about the nature of irregular
operations at sea, it would seem that they do have characteristics in common, even though the form
of those characteristics vary in accordance with the specific circumstances in which they are
conducted. The overall principles seem much the same although their application may vary.
Is It Different or the Same at Sea?
Finally, there remains the question of whether there is anything about the maritime domain that
marks irregular operations at sea from their counterpart on land. One thing at least seems clear, such
activities are closely linked to and often largely determined by events ashore. However, both the cases
examined suggest that the consequences of activities afloat can have very considerable consequences
for the land campaign. In the Sri Lankan case, the SLN’s ability to cut the LTTE supply lines deprived
their forces on land of support and contributed significantly to the LTTE’s defeat at the hands of the
Sri Lankan army and air force.
While this demonstrates how intimately operations afloat may be linked to those ashore, it is
much easier to imagine an irregular land campaign that has no bearing on events afloat than the
reverse. There may be an element of strategic dependency about such operations that is much less
true of their land equivalent.
A second line of distinctiveness that might be pursued is a consequence of the sheer size of the
maritime domain, which means that responding to the moves of the other side might well require
action almost at a global level. Dealing with ST supply ships, for example, required a navy essentially
configured for coastal missions to engage in deep sea operations off Sumatra, 1,500 miles from home.
Likewise, what happened off the coast of Palestine was due to major operations of intelligence,
organization, and persuasion by the British and their opponents around the world. And today,
tracking vessels of interest is truly a global matter.
Action at sea has often been associated with the adage “out of sight, out of mind” because what
happens at sea is much less visible to politicians and the public at home. Historically this has provided
commanders at sea with much more operational freedom and perhaps less accountability than their
counterparts ashore. Since the sea is much less populated than the land, it may be easier there to
observe the legal restraints on the use of armed force than it is on shore, but this is more a difference
of degree than of kind.
With these possible exceptions, it would seem that in principle more unites irregular operations
ashore and afloat than divides them, and conclusions about how best to prepare for and to conduct
them are generally common to both domains.
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 2
The Development of Doctrine to Address Operational Challenges
Associated with Unmanned Maritime Systems
Andrew J. Norris, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.)
Tradewind Maritime Services

Relevance of Topic to Field of Maritime Irregular Warfare
Unmanned maritime systems (UMS) are “irregular” by nature, as they constitute a revolutionary
emerging technology that poses significant physical, operational, and doctrinal challenges. These
challenges apply both to the affirmative use of UMS and to defend against their use by adversaries.
Those adversaries may be near-peer competitors, or irregular armed groups, terrorists, or criminals
who seek to leverage capabilities offered by UMS that, for cost reasons or otherwise, would be out of
reach through the use of conventional systems.
Significance of Topic
UMS are already here to stay, and their complexity and range of missions will continue to increase in
the coming years. As the executive editor of a leading technical publication has written:
Unmanned vehicles carrying advanced sensor and processing payloads proliferate the modern
battlefield, in the air, on the ground, and at sea. The number of unmanned ground, aerial, and
undersea vehicles deployed by aerospace and defense organizations has grown exponentially
given the many benefits they deliver.1
Yet despite their current and anticipated proliferation, there are many difficult physical,
operational, and doctrinal challenges that need to be solved before UMS can reach their full potential.
A DOD-chartered task force concluded that “while currently fielded unmanned systems are making
positive contributions across DoD operations, autonomy technology is being underutilized as a result
of material obstacles within the Department that are inhibiting the broad acceptance of autonomy
and its ability to more fully realize the benefits of unmanned systems.” Key among these obstacles
identified by the task force are poor design, lack of effective coordination of research and
development (R&D) efforts across the military services, and operational challenges created by the
urgent deployment of unmanned systems to theater without adequate resources or time to refine
concepts of operations and training.2
The development and refinement of “concepts of operations and training” is critical to the full
maturation of UMS as a tool for commanders, and for countering their use by adversaries.
Research Question
As a question: “What are the operational challenges posed by the affirmative use of UMS, or by
countering their use by adversaries, and how should they be resolved?”

1
2

Courtney Howard, “Unmanned, Sensor-Laden, and Ubiquitous,” Military and Aerospace Electronics, July 1, 2012.
DOD, Defense Science Board, “The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems,” DOD, 19 July 2012.
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As a statement: “This project will examine the operational challenges posed by the affirmative
use of UMS and by countering their use by adversaries, and will make recommendations for the
development of doctrine to deal with these challenges.”
The purpose of the project is to identify and thoroughly discuss the most salient issues posed by
the use of or defense against such systems, with the aim of forcing the adoption and shaping the
direction of doctrine to guide commanders who would otherwise face some of the many challenges
posed by such systems without any standing guidance.
It is important to note that the focus on “operational challenges” will not be on the design of these
systems per se, nor on their tactical employment. Instead, the focus will be on larger legal and ethical
issues raised by the paradigm-changing nature of such systems. The intent will be to address and
answer “can I?” questions. In doing so, there may be some derivative consequences to such other
issues as design and tactical employment.
And while UMS pose challenges in both the military and commercial sectors, the focus of this
analysis will be only on the military use of such systems.
Proposed Outline
I. Introduction, including statement of research topic
II. Definitions, commons terms, and understandings [UMS, UUV, USV, autonomous, semiautonomous, etc.]
III. Necessary background information
A. Maritime zones and their impact on UMS employment
B. Law of war issues related to UMS
IV. Issues associated with their affirmative use
A. What are uses contemplated by DOD doctrine?
B. What issues are posed by such anticipated uses?
1. Issue 1
2. Issue 2 (etc.)
V. Issues associated with defending against the use of UMS by adversaries
A. How may potential adversaries attempt to use such systems?
B. What issues are posed by defense against such anticipated uses?
1. Issue 1
2. Issue 2 (etc.)
VI. Recommendations for the development of doctrine to address these issues
VII. Conclusion
Discussion / Conclusion
According to the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence’s “Guidance for
Developing Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) Capability,” the following affirmative uses of UMS
are contemplated by the U.S. and NATO allies:
For unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV):
(1) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
(2) Mine countermeasures (MCM)
(3) Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
(4) Inspection/identification (ID)
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(5) Oceanography/hydrography
(6) Communication/navigation network node (CN3)
(7) Payload delivery
(8) Influence activities (IA)
(9) Time critical strike (TCS)
For unmanned surface vehicles (USV):
(1) Mine countermeasures (MCM)
(2) Anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
(3) Maritime security (MS)
(4) Surface warfare (SUW)
(5) Special Operations Forces (SOF) support
(6) Electronic warfare (EW)
(7) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) support
Other potential uses of UMS that aren’t strictly military include their use in law enforcement
platforms.
The intent of this project is to identify the “can I?” issues related to these and other potential uses
of UMS, to discuss the salient points related to each such issue, and to make recommendations on a
solution in order to guide the development of doctrine and training that addresses these issues up
front, instead of on an ad hoc basis as they are encountered in real time. A non-exclusive list of such
issues includes:
A. Maritime zones (for example, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to
navigate on the surface and to show their flag when operating in another nation’s territorial sea)
B. Sovereign immunity for government property
C. Rights and obligations of warships (for example, warships are entitled to engage in right of
visit; are UMS “warships” for purpose of this entitlement?)
D. Rules of the road compliance (for example, how can a proper and adequate lookout be
maintained?)
E. Law of armed conflict issues (for example, how can an unmanned system comply with
requirements of necessity and proportionality without human involvement?)
F. General maritime law (for example, where the law of the sea imposes certain duties on the
master of a vessel [UNCLOS Article 98], how [if at all] can that be complied with by a UMS?)
G. Liability, search and rescue (SAR) and human rights at sea. There are unique issues posed
by the use of UMS for law enforcement or other military operations other than war. For
example, if the crew of a vessel that is the subject of a law enforcement operation scuttles
their vessel, the case converts from law enforcement to SAR. How, if at all, can, or should, UMS
be able to “morph” from a law enforcement to a SAR platform?
H. Adversaries’ use of UMS for military purposes. What unique issues, if any, are posed by
efforts to counter adversaries’ use of UMS for military purposes?
I. Adversaries’ use of UMS for non-military purposes, e.g. to commit maritime crimes. Who
would be charged with a crime? If the actus reus involves a crime committed by a “ship,” does
a UMS qualify?
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 3

The Russian Maritime Arctic: A Region of Great Change in the 21st Century
Captain Lawson W. Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), PhD
Wilson Center and University of Alaska, Fairbanks
Abstract
The Russian maritime Arctic is undergoing profound change early in the 21st century. Arctic sea ice
retreat (in extent, thickness, and ice character) is providing for greater marine access and potentially
longer seasons of marine navigation throughout the Arctic Ocean. These environmental changes are
principally observed in the coastal seas of the Russian Arctic and are providing new opportunities for
use of Russia’s national Arctic waterway, the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The most influential drivers
of change in this once remote Arctic region are the development of Russian Arctic natural resources
and the emerging marine transport of these commodities to global markets. During the Soviet era,
the NSR was a waterway that linked natural resources to domestic needs, mainly the requirements of
the Soviet defense ministry. Today the national strategy is to link the vast Siberian resource base to
the global economy, an economic security challenge of critical importance to the future of the Russian
Federation. This Russian Arctic strategy demands broad attention: key marine infrastructure
development (such as ports, hydrography, communications, and more); domestic and foreign
investment (from France, China, and others); application of new host of advanced marine
technologies; the buildup of Russian Arctic security forces; the renewal of the Russian icebreaker fleet
(including new nuclear ships); advancing the Russian ship traffic monitoring and surveillance system;
and overall development of the onshore and offshore coastal regions of this long coastline in an era
of intense climate change.
This case study will review all of these changes and developments and consider what they mean to
the future of the Arctic and the Russian Federation. Plausible futures will be developed to better
understand the uncertainties that could impact these major changes and how they might influence
Arctic state relations and the future geopolitical stability of the region. Scenarios may include the
impacts of a major marine accident and the increasing interests by China and its announcement of a
“Polar Silk Road” as a component to its Belt and Road Initiative. The roles of non-Arctic states and the
increasing marine use of foreign shippers in the Russian maritime Arctic will be considered throughout.
Relevance and Significance of the Topic to Maritime Irregular Warfare
The Russian maritime Arctic has always been one of the remotest regions on the planet. However,
increasing marine access and economic development of Arctic natural resources have fundamentally
changed the region. The region is a difficult and extreme polar marine environment, which means
access by domestic and foreign military forces and civilian operators remains challenging. Increasing
monitoring and surveillance of the Russian Arctic will increase, and the Russian polar fleet,
particularly its nuclear icebreakers, will provide a sovereign presence in all seasons and any part of
the Russian coastal seas. For the top of the world it likely the Russian Arctic will be the most dynamic
through the 21st century. One question will be the long-term political stability of the region and its
relationship to Moscow and the central government. The role of China in development of the Russian
Arctic and overall Russia-China cooperation in the decades ahead will be crucial to future relations
with the U.S. and the West. Maritime irregular warfare in the Arctic is evolving, and the Russian
maritime Arctic—half of the coastline of the Arctic Ocean—will be a dynamic region of potential
friction and also cooperation.
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Preliminary Case Study Outline
I. Introduction
Significance of the region to the Arctic and Russia, and to Arctic maritime security
II. Geography, Environment, and Boundaries
UNCLOS (internal waters, EEZ, Article 234), boundaries and the polar environment;
connections/roles of the northward flowing Siberian rivers
III. Changing Marine Access
Impact of climate change on sea ice and permafrost; marine access projections; impacts on
the Russian Arctic national waterway (Northern Sea Route)
IV. Regional Economic Development
Russian Arctic resource development: oil, gas (LNG), hard minerals; roles of Yamal LNG and
oil development; role of Norilsk (copper, nickel, more); onshore and offshore development;
the roles of the Northern Sea Route/NSR (domestic and international marine traffic); Russia
Arctic/Northern policies
V. Marine Infrastructure Developments
Emerging Russian polar icebreaker fleet, including new nuclear icebreakers; marine
infrastructure developments: ports, hydrography/charting, aids to navigation, monitoring
and surveillance; role of new technologies (icebreaking, LNG-powered ships, floating nuclear
power plants, floating North Pole Station for the central Arctic Ocean, use of drones, more);
Russian stability/control in the vast Siberian region and Russian Far East
VI. National Security Interests
Developments on the Kola Peninsula and Siberian islands; new Russian Navy icebreakers
and FSN law enforcement icebreakers; domain awareness and area control; Russian policies
and Arctic national security interests
VII. International Aspects
China-Russia cooperation in investment and long-term contracts (oil and LNG); China’s
“Polar Silk Road” as a component of the Belt and Road initiative; presence of foreign-flag
ships along the NSR and in the Barents Sea; cooperation with Norway in Barents Sea oil/gas
and fisheries; International Maritime Organization Polar Code implementation and
enforcement; continued Russian involvement in the Arctic Council; overall governance of the
Russian maritime Arctic and adherence to international norms; future scientific research
with the Russian Arctic EEZ
VIII. Plausible Futures of the Russian Maritime Arctic
Futures of the region to 2040 and beyond; identification of continued, major drivers of
change; influence of potential wildcard drivers of future change; what to expect from this
region as it is increasingly linked to global markets and the Russian domestic economy; what
to expect from profound climate change in the region
VIX. Conclusions and Future Research
Overall concluding remarks and relationships of this dynamic and changing region to the globe,
and to irregular warfare; potential areas of further research for the USN, USMC, USCG, USNWC
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 4
Sea Shepherd – A Non-State Navy Responding to a Global Challenge: The
Evolution of Sea Shepherd from Environmental Activist/Outlaw to
Legitimized Maritime Security Partner in Capacity Building
Claude Berube, PhD
U.S. Naval Academy
Relevance of Topic to Field of Maritime Irregular Warfare
Examining Sea Shepherd’s goals, strategies, platforms, and tactics is a worthwhile endeavor because
it serves as a model to understand the motives, operations, and threat posed by emerging maritime
non-state actors (MNSAs). Understanding the irregular challenges these MNSAs pose can help navies
and coast guards respond to similarly structured groups in the future. In addition, Sea Shepherd itself
has gained some growing state-sponsored legitimacy and might indicate how a non-state actor could
gain acceptance among businesses, NGOs and states.
Significance of Topic
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (hereafter SSCS) has a 42-year history as an evolving organization
with global support.
In April 2015, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society ship Sam Simon completed a 10,000
nautical mile, 110-day chase of an illegal fishing trawler from the Southern Ocean to West Africa,
culminating in the scuttling of the trawler Thunder, the rescue of its crew, and the successful
prosecution of its captain. In the course of the chase, the Sam Simon worked with more than two
dozen countries as well as Interpol. This event was a game-changer for the organization, which had
a four-decade history of touting itself as a “pirate” organization taking action on behalf of marine life.
With the chase of the Thunder, Sea Shepherd demonstrated a willingness to work with nation states
and those nation states in giving some legitimacy to it in return.
Sea Shepherd is responding to a growing crisis of fish depletion. Fewer fish, particularly in littoral
regions of small states, has an immediate economic impact to nation states that have insufficient
resources to patrol their own waters in response especially to illegal, unregulated, and unreported
(IUU) fishing. This case study is about the organization but also weighs its value as a business model
for responding to the growing scarcity of marine food and the economic and national security
implications of that challenge between state powers.
Research Question
How has an environmental activist organization viewed by some as pirates or terrorists evolved to
become a global enterprise with a fleet of ships working with local and state governments for
maritime security?
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Proposed Outline
I. Introduction
II. Today’s SSCS: The Chase of the Thunder
III. History and Goals and Strategy
IV. Campaigns, Logistics, and Organization
V. Platforms and Tactics
VI. Lawfare
VII. Successes/Failures
Discussion/Conclusion
Beyond the local level, depleted fisheries hurt national economies. A 2005 report by the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development reviewed the economic impact of IUU fishing
on 10 developing countries. The report estimated that $372 million was lost annually through illegal
fishing in the exclusive economic zones of those countries, representing nearly 20 percent of the total
catch. Off the coast of Guinea alone, up to 60 percent of vessels sighted in 2001 were illegal. Among
five nations (Seychelles, Namibia, Mauritania, Gambia, and Comoros), illegal fishing diminished gross
national product by 10 to 20 percent.
In an age of austerity, few nations are able to commit the resources in terms of manpower,
platforms, or technologies to enforce international or national laws. The U.S. government set out 15
recommendations in 2014 from the Presidential Task Force to combat IUU fishing, but these were
largely procedural considerations with no apparent mechanism for platforms or manpower. Two
recommendations had promise. One called for international capacity building, but included no real
assets, and the final stage of implementing a strategy would not be complete until mid-2016 (nearly
two years after the report). Another called for partnerships. The U.S. Coast Guard has a long history
of capacity-building, but its resources are a drop in the ocean.
There is, however, one opening in this latter recommendation. Just as one federal agency alone
cannot combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, these issues cannot be addressed only by federal or
state governments. It is important that federal agencies join forces and take strong steps in
partnership with nonfederal entities such as harvesters, importers, dealers, retailers, processors,
academia, and nongovernmental organizations.
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 5
Irregular Warfare in the Arctic Islands: Past and Future
Rebecca Pincus, PhD
U.S. Naval War Colleg

Relevance of Topic to Field
Growing awareness of rapid environmental change and increasingly competitive dynamics in the
Arctic region are driving securitization, particularly linked with more assertive Russian actions and
clear expressions of interest by China. While the threat of open conflict in the Arctic region remains
low, as noted in the Navy’s recent Strategic Outlook for the Arctic (January 2019), the challenge of gray
zone or hybrid challenges has been noted. Characterizing the Arctic as a “strategically competitive
space,” the Coast Guard’s Strategic Outlook for the Arctic noted that Russia and China “have both
declared [the Arctic] a national priority and made corresponding investments in capability and
capacity to expand their influence.” Taken together, these assessments point to growing concern about
strategic competition in the Arctic region between the U.S. and its major rivals—competition that will
remain below the level of outright conflict, but will be active and intentional within the “gray zone.”
More broadly, as U.S. and NATO attention has returned to the High North, it is appropriate to
reexamine the lessons of past operations in the region. At one time, the islands of the GIUK gap were
considered of the utmost strategic importance. The lesson of WWII-era landings on Greenland, Iceland,
and Svalbard for U.S. leaders during the Cold War was that these islands must be secured under the
NATO umbrella. Bringing Iceland, Denmark, and Norway into the alliance as founding members was a
chief U.S. objective—partly due to the strategic geographic benefits that would result.1
In addition, a great deal of recent attention has focused on the Russian buildup of military and
dual-use infrastructure on the Russian Arctic islands. From Wrangel Island in the east near the Bering
Strait, through the New Siberian islands and Severnya Zemlya in the center, to Franz Josef Land and
Novaya Zemlya in the West, the Russian Arctic islands are a central component of the Kremlin’s efforts
to strengthen its security position in the far north as ice retreats. The Nagurskoye base in the Franz
Josef Land archipelago (on the western island of Alexandra Land) features a new 2,500-meter
hardened runway that can handle heavy aircraft year-round.2 In addition, Nagurskoye includes a
year-round trefoil base for Russian border guard troops.3 The Nagurskoye base is approximately 200
miles from Svalbard, and aircraft launched from Nagurskoye could target the Thule base in northern
Greenland. While some of the Russian buildup can be understood as rebuilding capabilities that were
lost following the Cold War (for example, Nagurskoye dates back to the 1950s), other aspects of
Russian plans, like the spread of the S-400 missile system, are of more concern.4
In recent months, some observers have speculated that Svalbard is likely to be targeted by Russia
with a Crimea-type hybrid warfare attack.5 Similar speculation has surrounded Greenland and
1 For further information, see Lundestad, Geir. America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War 1945-1949 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1980); Tamnes, Rolf. The United States and the Cold War in the High North
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1991).
2 Staalesen, Atle. “Big Upgrade for Russia’s Northernmost Airstrip,” The Barents Observer, 26 September 2018,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/09/big-upgrade-worlds-northernmost-airstrip.
3 Nilsen, Thomas. “Russian Border Guard Service Conquers the North Pole,” The Barents Observer, 13 April 2017,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/borders/2017/04/russian-border-guards-conquer-north-pole.
4 Luhn, Alec. “Russia to Deploy Top Air Defense Missiles to the Arctic,” Telegraph, 16 April 2019.
5 See, for example, Zimmerman, Michael. “High North and High Stakes: The Svalbard Archipelago Could Be the
Epicenter of Rising Tension in the Arctic,” PRISM Journal of Complex Operations 7, No. 4 (November 2018): 107-
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Iceland due to their strategic locations and the deepening tension with Russia. While Russian hybrid
methods have demonstrably altered facts on the ground in Ukraine, the assumption that Svalbard
may be next requires careful parsing. However, in the new era of competition and tension between
Russia and NATO, do these islands still hold the keys to the North Atlantic? Will they simply be the
site of defensive and offensive installations, and subject to long-range, high-end attacks? Or will they
be actively contested through irregular, low-end means, as during World War II?
These questions are important to designing strategy as well as to service and unit-level
preparations for refamiliarization with the High North. During Exercise Trident Juncture in late 2018,
U.S. Marines, staging from Navy amphibious ships, simulated a landing in Alvund, Norway, using
amphibious assault vehicles, light armored vehicles, and humvees.6 The challenges associated with
high-latitude training operations during Trident Juncture demonstrate the importance of area
familiarization to successful outcomes at all levels of strategy and operations. The large-scale effort
undertaken in support of Trident Juncture reflects the growing importance of maritime operations in
the Arctic region, especially the area between Iceland and Norway. Large-scale exercises and training
opportunities should be built on identified needs and provide tailored learning—making the lessons
of past operations both relevant and timely components of current-day planning.
The core research approach: What were the strategic objectives and imperatives associated with
Greenland and Svalbard during World War II, and how did the series of irregular warfare operations
on those islands advance those ends? What has changed since then, in both military technology and
geostrategic context? From a methodic inquiry into the ways in which geographic and technological
necessity drove small-scale landings on Greenland, Iceland, and Svalbard, this paper will turn to the
present: While the geography has remained the same, technology has altered strategy. What strategic
objectives and imperatives would drive U.S. and allied operations in Svalbard and Greenland in the
event of conflict with Russia?
The paper will identify the strategic objectives, operational context, and tactical challenges that
shaped operations in Greenland and Svalbard in the past, and will examine how these considerations
have changed. The aim is to provide a nuanced, historically informed perspective on the likelihood
and nature of irregular maritime warfare in the Arctic islands.
Proposed Outline/Key Arguments
Greenland and Svalbard have been loci of active irregular warfare operations as well as diplomatic
wrangling in previous decades. With the return of global great power competition, the history of
irregular warfare in the Arctic islands is worth reviewing. This paper will argue that a thorough
understanding of past irregular warfare operations in Greenland and Svalbard provides insight into
the current and future purposes of such operations.
How did they drive strategy and operations in the past? How might they drive strategy and
operations in the future? Should the U.S. be prepared to send small teams into remote, hazardous,
and challenging island terrain as before, or has that need passed? What missions would expeditionary
forces seek to accomplish today?

123; Williamson, Lee. “Tensions in the High North: The Case of Svalbard,” NATO Association of Canada 21 August
2018, http://natoassociation.ca/tensions-in-the-high-north-the-case-of-svalbard/; Closson, Stacy. “Good
Fences Make Good Neighbors: Russia and Norway’s Svalbard,” Wilson Center, Kennan Cable No. 37, 20 November
2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-37-good-fences-make-good-neighborsrussia-and-norways-svalbard.
6 Eckstein, Megan. “Trident Juncture Wraps Up After Successful Amphibious Landings, Training Ashore in
Norway,” USNI News, 7 November 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/11/07/trident-juncture-wraps-up-afterseveral-amphibious-landings-training-ashore.
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A basic policy/strategy match analysis framework can be applied backwards to the historical
irregular operations in Greenland and Svalbard, and forwards to possible scenarios involving Russia
in the near term. One scenario will be primarily defensive and explore possible responses to Russian
irregular operations against Greenland and Svalbard; and the other will be primarily offensive and
assess the use of U.S. and NATO irregular operations in response to a Russian conventional move
against Greenland and Svalbard.
Outline:
1. Introduction (define IW, identify relevance of topic to Arctic region today, lay out
research framework)
2. History of irregular warfare in Greenland and Svalbard (review operations and analyze
using identified framework)
3. Describe current security situation and identify possible threats; apply framework to
use of maritime irregular operations
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions and recommendations
Conclusion
This paper proposal outlines an inquiry into the basis for irregular maritime warfare operations in
the Arctic islands of Greenland and Svalbard in the past, and their potential uses at present in the
context of conflict with Russia.
The resulting case study will amplify and extend a growing body of research into the emerging
dynamics of the strategically competitive space of the Arctic. It will build on existing studies, and
connect the historical record with current discussions of possible irregular warfare scenarios in the
Arctic, with a particular focus on the key strategic points of Svalbard and Greenland.
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 6
Countering Coercion in the South China Sea: The Role of Strategic Culture
Kerry Lynn Nankivell

Senior Strategic Analyst, Public Safety Canada
PhD Candidate, King’s College London
Summary
U.S. strategy to counter PRC gray zone operations in the South China Sea has met with little success.
Premised on twin pillars of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) and partner assistance via
the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), the results of U.S. strategy to date have not delivered the
anticipated results. The approach was conceptualized as a non-escalatory sea denial campaign that
would resist PRC coercion in the South China Sea through paramilitary forces of small partners. Four
years on however, neither U.S. presence nor U.S. assistance has enabled Southeast Asian states to
defend their interests more vigorously in contested waters. This outcome defies both conventional
realist and rationalist theory, and presents a puzzle for scholars of unconventional conflict in the
wider field of strategic studies. Finding little new insight in the conventional strategic studies
domains, this project will examine the impact of a state’s strategic culture on its partnership at sea
with the United States. The examination will add new depth to our understanding of the Southeast
Asian seascape, and offers U.S. policy makers the opportunity to better calibrate engagement policy
to its realities.
Significance of Topic
An examination of strategic culture as a determinant of U.S. engagement in asymmetric environments
at sea has immediate significance. In an alarmingly brief period of time, China and her three maritime
services have jointly established de facto control of much of the South China Sea. Beijing has
accomplished this through incremental gains made almost entirely by paramilitary forces, including
civilian vessels that have been enlisted into national service on a part-time basis.
The process of consolidating Beijing’s dominance in the South China Sea began in earnest when
the PRC successfully wrested the disputed Scarborough Shoal from nominal Filipino control in April
2012. That initial move, largely unopposed, was followed in 2013 with large-scale land reclamation
projects undertaken at seven Chinese-held features in the Spratly Islands. Land reclamation
eventually enabled overt militarization of the PRC’s seven occupied features, starting in 2017. At the
time of writing, Beijing has built what look to be three logistics and air support facilities in the Spratly
Islands (at Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross Reefs).1 All seven features host surveillance capabilities and
large anti-aircraft guns, lending them utility in peace time, as well as point-defense capacity in the
event of any overt hostilities in the surrounding waters.2 In May 2018, reports confirm that the PRC
deployed anti-air and anti-ship cruise missiles to the three larger features, allowing the PRC to strike

“Build It and They Will Come,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, August 1, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/
build-it-and-they-will-come/.
2 “China’s New Spratly Island Defenses,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, December 13, 2016,
https://amti.csis.org/chinas-new-spratly-island-defenses/.
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any target within 295 nm of the disputed reefs,3 giving the PLA easy reach to stretches of sea up to
the Philippine, Malaysian, and Bruneian coasts.
The Spratly Islands’ military accoutrements are complemented by the more hardened capabilities
deployed to the PRC-controlled Paracel Island chain to the northwest. This island chain has also
undergone substantial enlargement and hardening in the last five years. Additionally, starting in
2016, the PRC deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to Woody Island in the Paracels, making
it the site of credible force projection at some distance from the mainland Chinese coast.4 Probably
reverse-engineered from Russian S-300 or -400s air defense system, the HQ-9 is China’s primary
long-range missile, boasting a range of approximately 125 miles.5 When considered together, both
the more capable HQ-9 in the Paracels and the smaller-range anti-air guns in the Spratlys give Beijing
an increasingly credible, muti-layered sea denial capability throughout the semi-enclosed South
China Sea.
The fixed armaments in the two groups of features provide the logistic skeleton for the PRC
presence in the South China Sea, but its maritime services and their surface fleets are its lifeblood. As
has been amply documented by the U.S. Naval War College’s Connor Kennedy and Andrew Erickson,
Beijing has modernized its Navy and Coast Guard in the last decade while also complementing it with
a highly effective maritime militia. The militia is composed of fishing vessels that are fitted with
communication and navigational equipment provided by the PRC government, while its seafarers
undergo regular military training, and benefit from awards, titles and recognitions, and financial
compensation from Beijing.6 Through coordinated use of its navy, air force (including strategic missile
force), coast guard, and maritime militia, the PRC has harassed and intimidated its neighbors
whenever they seek to exercise sovereignty over what they believe are their own jurisdictions.7
This research proposal aims to harness theoretical insights related to strategic culture to examine
U.S. engagement policy in Southeast Asia since the MSI was launched in 2015, in order to offer some
explanation for the counterintuitive results of U.S. policy to date. It will complement existing,
primarily materialist, studies of the dynamics of the South China Sea with a thorough consideration
of regional strategic culture. The approach will give rise to new questions about the South China Sea
disputes and new answers about the best way forward for U.S. strategy.
Research Question
What is the role of strategic culture in explaining the outcomes of the U.S. approach to countering PRC
coercion in the South China Sea?

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China in 2019. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2, 2019,
https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_ REPORT.pdf.
4 “China Flies Nuclear-Capable Bomber in the South China Sea after Trump Taiwan Call, U.S. Officials Say,” Fox
News, December 9, 2016, https://www.foxnews.com/ world/china-flies-nuclear-capable-bomber-in-southchina-sea-after-trump-taiwan-call-us-officials-say.
5 “China’s HQ-9 vs. Russia’s S-300 Air Defense System: What’s the Difference?,” The National Interest, November
10, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ chinas-hq-9-vs-russias-s-300-air-defense-system-whatsdifference-3577.
6 See, inter alia, Kennedy, C. “The Struggle for Blue Territory,” RUSI Journal, 163: 5, 2018, 8-19; Erickson, Andrew.
“China’s Third Sea Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, 21 September, 2016, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/
20160921/105309/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-EricksonPhDA-20160921.pdf.
7 Green, M., et al. Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies (New York,
NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
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Outline
I. Review of existing literature on Southeast Asian responses to Chinese gray zone
aggression, including identification of gaps
II. Review of existing literature on strategic culture and its impact on military strategy
and the formulation of state interest, with particular emphasis on Asia
III. What can regional strategic cultures explain about Southeast Asia’s responses to
Chinese gray zone aggression:
A. Southeast Asia, in regional terms
B. Philippines
C. Malaysia
D. Vietnam
IV. Implications for U.S. policy: What does this investigation of Southeast Asian strategic
culture suggest for effective U.S. strategy in Southeast Asian seas?
Discussion/Conclusion
This study aims to be the first exploration of the role of strategic culture in explaining the
unsatisfactory status quo in the South China Sea. The question has immediate relevance to both the
field of strategic studies and the development of U.S. maritime policy and strategy in Asia.
Conventional studies have not succeeded in predicting the current state of affairs, in which U.S.
capacity building efforts have, counterintuitively, not resulted in Southeast Asian resistance to PRC
paramilitary coercion in disputed waters. This study will aim to fill the explanatory gap left by
conventional thinking as a means to informing redesigned U.S. approaches to Southeast Asian seas.
In the academic context, the study aims to deliver new insights into the effects of strategic culture on
maritime policy and operations that should also apply to other regional contexts.
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 7
Hybrid Maritime Warfare
Jan Asmussen, PhD

Polish Naval Academy

Gary Schaub, Jr., PhD

University of Copenhagen

Relevance of Topic to the Field
Russia’s revanchist grand strategy requires the use of deniable means of coercion to target political,
military, economic, social, and cultural seams in adversaries to disrupt, confuse, and favorably change
the potential battle space for subsequent political operations. The maritime domain provides ample
opportunities to implement such strategies. Maritime services in the European littorals, and NATO as
an institution, are revising their practices to address these challenges but not necessarily revising
their strategies, concepts of operation, training, tactics, and procedures, exercise components, and
procurement priorities. They have focused on obvious and traditional maritime challenges and
require further analytic guidance.
Research Question
How have European maritime services and NATO responded to the challenges of hybrid maritime
threats posed by Russia, and how should they respond?
Policy, Strategy, and/or Operational Significance
The 2018 National Defense Strategy has reoriented the United States, and by implication its allies,
toward great power competition with Russia and China. Each of the Services are utilizing its guidance
to prepare for high intensity operations so as to effectively deter or, if necessary, defend against and
defeat overt aggression by these states. Yet, while these great powers are intent upon revising facts
on the ground in their regions, they have been careful to not trigger overt conflict with the United
States and its allies. They have turned to hybrid tactics to achieve their objectives.1
Hybrid maritime threats pose challenges to traditional maritime strategies by using multiple
mechanisms to reduce the ability of navies and coast guards to attain and maintain domain
awareness, the precondition for effective action. They utilize the maritime domain’s inherent ability
to conceal the activities of a full spectrum of personnel, vessels, and capabilities—private civilian,
commercial, government civilian, conventional military, and special operations forces—engaged in
shaping operations on, over, or under the water. As the actions of these forces are not intended to be
decisive in and of themselves, they present novel situations outside of the norm that are less likely to
Although our focus will be on Russia in the European littorals, hybrid maritime warfare perhaps constitutes
the core of Chinese efforts in the South China Sea. See James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Deterring China
in the ‘Gray Zone’: Lessons of the South China Sea for U.S. Alliances,” Orbis 61, 3 (2017); Michael Peck, “Little
Blue Sailors: Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming (in the South China Sea and Beyond),” The National Interest
(18 December 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/little-blue-sailors-maritime-hybrid-warfarecoming-the-south-18769; Andrew S. Erickson, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and
Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” Testimony Before the House Armed Service Committee Seapower and
Projection Forces Subcommittee (21 September 2016); Hal Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” FPRI E-Notes
(February 2016), https://www.fpri.org/docs/brands_-_grey_zone.pdf; and Hongzhou Zhang and Sam Bateman,
“Fishing Militia, the Securitization of Fishery and the South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia
39, 2 (August 2017).
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be noticed, assessed, and countered. Even if they are noticed and assessed as adversarial, their
nondecisive and incremental nature introduces the temptation to defer action and adjust
expectations to the revised status quo, as no particular step or action warrants action in and of itself.
As such, hybrid maritime threats create low-risk opportunities for making substantive gains over the
long term.
The risk is that these steady-state shaping operations will be acknowledged but marginalized in
the maritime strategies, concepts, operations, and practices of Western navies.
Proposed Outline/Key Arguments
1. Revising Maritime Strategies in the Gray Zone of Great Power Competition
2. Hybrid Maritime Warfare
A. Grey Hybrid Maritime Warfare
B. Unconventional Hybrid Naval Warfare
3. Russian Use of Hybrid Maritime Strategies
4. Countering Hybrid Maritime Threats
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Revising Maritime Strategies in the Gray Zone of Great Power Competition
NATO’s Maritime Strategy of 2011 “identifies the four roles of NATO’s maritime forces: deterrence
and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security – outreach through partnerships,
dialogue and cooperation; and maritime security.”2 The 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit Declaration
emphasized that NATO’s “Standing Naval Forces … are being enhanced and will be aligned with
NATO’s enhanced NATO Response Force to provide NATO’s highest readiness maritime forces.”3 In
2018, NATO, in conjunction with the U.S. Navy’s reactivation of the Second Fleet, decided to reestablish Atlantic Command “to ensure dedicated reinforcement of the continent and demonstrate a
capable and credible deterrence effect” given “return to great power competition and a resurgent
Russia.”4 While vitally important for deterrence of, and reinforcement after, overt conventional
aggression by Russia on the Eurasian continent, NATO’s approach to maritime challenges, and those
of its constituent navies, risks marginalizing the more likely and more effective actions that Russia
has already undertaken.
The 2014 Russian campaign in Crimea included a considerable range of maritime elements.5
Hybrid warfare at sea is not confined to the Crimea or the Black Sea region. “In light of the substantial
conventional superiority of NATO and partner nations in the Baltic Sea along with the overall strategic
situation … hybrid scenarios like the ones witnessed in the Black Sea become increasingly possible”
in the Baltic Sea region.6 They are also increasingly used in the High North and Arctic Sea.7 Maritime

NATO Maritime Strategy, paragraph 19.
Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, paragraph 49.
4 Pentagon spokesperson Johnny Michael, quoted by Associated Press, “‘Great Power Competition’: NATO
Announces Atlantic Command to Counter Russia,” The Guardian (5 May 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/may/05/great-power-competition-nato-announces-atlantic-command-to-counter-russia.
5 Martin Murphy, Frank G. Hoffman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., Hybrid Maritime Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region,
(Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, November 2016).
6 Adrian J. Neumann and Sebastian Bruns, editors, Focus on the Baltic Sea: Proceedings from the Kiel Conference
2015 (Kiel: Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University, 2015), page 15.
7 Pavel K. Baev, “Threat Assessments and Strategic Objectives in Russia’s Arctic Policy,” The Journal of Slavic
Military Studies 32, 1 (January 2019); Tony Balasevicius, “Russia’s ‘New Generation War’ and Its Implications
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environments offer excellent conditions for covert, clandestine, and other actions that are difficult to
attribute, and Russia has demonstrated its ability to utilize them to achieve significant political,
military, economic, and territorial objectives.8
2. Hybrid Maritime Warfare
The deliberate ambiguity inherent in hybrid strategies has driven conceptual and analytic debates
that have yielded some light and more heat.9 We synthesize this literature and define hybrid warfare
as the use of deniable means of coercion to target political, military, economic, social, and cultural
seams in adversaries to disrupt, confuse, and favorably change the potential battle space for
subsequent political operations.
Hybrid maritime warfare applies this conception to the maritime environment, particularly in
coastal waters and in the littorals. We can distinguish between three categories of hybrid threats:
grey, unconventional, and cross-domain.
Grey hybrid maritime warfare is conducted by irregular, nonstate forces, including private civilian
personnel, commercial personnel such as fishermen, and criminals such as pirates, terrorists, and
smugglers. They utilize civilian vessels armed with light, temporary mounted guns, shouldermounted missiles, mines, and nonlethal weapons such as tear gas, water cannons, and sound. They
use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) communications gear for command and control purposes, as
well as commercially available capabilities, such as remotely controlled unmanned aerial vehicles or
even marine life,10 for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions. Given their
affiliations and equipment, their activities are difficult to attribute to any particular state actor or
navy, although at times white-hulled coast guard vessels may provide assistance and command and
control capacities to these nonstate actors.11
Unconventional hybrid naval warfare is conducted by (in some cases marked) naval personnel
from amphibious special operation forces, amphibious light infantry, and units of combat swimmers.
They utilize grey-hulled patrol boats, mini submarines, and so-called auxiliary submarines
(SSA/SSAN) that are remote-controlled or autonomous to conduct their operations. Their armaments
include unconventional naval weapons, however, including mines,12 seabed acoustic sensors (SAS),
container missile systems, and armatures to manipulate objects on the seabed. Their command and
control capabilities, as well as those used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are highend military capabilities, including auxiliary submarines (SSA) and nuclear-powered auxiliary
submarines (SSNA). Although unconventional naval warfare is not novel, as covert operations by
for the Arctic,” The Mackenzie Institute (10 November 2015), https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2015/11/
russias-new-generation-war-and-its-implications-for-the-arctic/.
8 Stephen J Cimbala, “Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21
February–.18 March 2014,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27, 3 (Autumn 2014); Colby Howard and Ruslan
Puhkov, editors, Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2014).
9 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War (Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies, December 2007); Roger N. McDermott, “Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?” Parameters 46, 1
(2016); Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, 1 (2016); Andrew J. Duncan, “New
‘Hybrid War’ or Old ‘Dirty Tricks’? The Gerasimov Debate and Russia’s Response to the Contemporary Operating
Environment,” Canadian Military Journal 17, 3 (Summer 2017); Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the
‘Gerasimov Doctrine’,” Foreign Policy 5 (2018).
10 Rick Noack, “Alleged Russian Spy Whale Is Refusing to Leave and is Seeking Norwegians’ Attention, Authorities
Say,” The Washington Post (3 May 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2019/05/02/authoritiesalleged-russian-spy-whale-is-refusing-leave-seeking-norwegians-devotion/.
11 John Grady, “Experts: China Continues Using Fishing Fleets for Naval Presence Operations,” USNI News (17 August
2016), https://news.usni.org/2016/08/17/experts-china-using-fishing-fleets-naval-presence-operations.
12 Nick Childs, “Naval Mines: Curse or Blessing in Hybrid Warfare?” in Neumann and Bruns, editors, Focus on
the Baltic Sea, pages 44-49.
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Special Forces have always been carried out apart from major battlefield operations, they become
hybrid when their tasks are fulfilled without being recognized by the attacked party. Plausible
deniability is of course far more difficult in the case of grey hybrid naval warfare, as the high-end
equipment needed for its implementation will in most cases point to the perpetrators.
Cross-domain hybrid warfare can be conducted by state or nonstate agents utilizing means that
are difficult to attribute against maritime targets. Cyber means, in particular, are exemplars of crossdomain threats. Attacks on the communication structures and other computer-based elements of
modern navies, commercial shipping vessels, port facilities, or structures such as locks and dams can
significantly disrupt maritime traffic and associated activities and yield military, economic, political,
and social effects at sea and ashore.13 The global connectivity of cyberspace enables attacks from
every location on this planet, making attribution difficult and retaliation problematic.14
3. Russian Use of Hybrid Maritime Strategies
The Russian campaign in Crimea had many maritime elements. Many of the 15,000 naval personnel
that were stationed there, particularly the 2,000 members of the 810th Marines Infantry Brigade,
were deployed with their armored vehicles throughout Crimea to “to ensure the protection of places
of deployment of the Black Sea Fleet.”15
They were reinforced by thousands of troops from Russia proper, including a second naval
infantry brigade based at Novorossiisk, “two special forces brigades and a designated airborne
division.”16 These personnel surrounded Ukrainian military posts and governmental buildings,
provided advice and command to irregular forces throughout Crimea, and discriminately projected
power to “politely” intimidate Ukrainian forces, officials, and citizens ashore.17
Since the seizure and annexation of Crimea, Russian consolidation and expansion of its control
have had significant maritime dimensions. These include control over oil and gas reserves in what
had been Ukrainian territorial waters,18 the seizure and operation of Ukrainian oil rigs off the Black

Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain,” Naval
War College Review 67, 2 (2014), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/7; Martin
Murphy and Gary Schaub Jr., “Sea of Peace or Sea of War? How Maritime Hybrid Warfare Could Alter the Balance
on NATO’s Northern Flank,” Naval War College Review 71, 2 (Spring 2018).
14 Eric F. Mejia, “Act and Actor Attribution in Cyberspace: A Proposed Analytic Framework,” in Gary Schaub Jr.,
editor, Understanding Cybersecurity: Emerging Governance and Strategy (London: Rowman and Littlefield
International, 2018).
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “СООБЩЕНИЕ ДЛЯ СМИ: О встрече в МИД России с
советником-посланником Посольства Украины в России скои Федерации,” [“PRESS RELEASE: About the
meeting of the Russian Foreign Ministry with Minister Counselor of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Russian
Federation”]
(28
February
2014),
available
at
http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/newsline/
F2C86A40B49E817544257C8D00485C4F, accessed 26 July 2016; Ron Synovitz, “Russian Forces in Crimea:
Who Are They and Where Did They Come From?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (4 March 2014).
16 Synovitz, “Russian Forces in Crimea.”
17 Lukas Milevski, “Little Green Men in the Baltic States Are an Article 5 Event,” FPRI Baltic Bulletin (January
2016). In these ways, Russian hybrid behavior was similar to that described as “maritime irregular warfare” by
Molly Dunigan, Dick Hoffmann, Peter Chalk, Brian Nichiporuk, and Paul Deluca, Characterizing and Exploring
the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2012).
18 William J. Broad, “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,” The New York Times (17 May 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putin-gains-a-sea-of-fuelreserves.html.
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Sea coast,19 and access to the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait20 and the ability to affect significant
portions of Ukrainian imports and exports.21 Conflicts have arisen as Ukrainian forces have
challenged Russian control, including buzzing Russian oil rigs with military aircraft22 and the scuffle
between Ukrainian naval vessels and Russian Coast Guard vessels and military aircraft over access to
the Sea of Azov in November 2018.23
4. Countering Hybrid Maritime Threats
How can and should the United States and allied nations address such challenges when directed at
them or non-allied partners such as Ukraine?
NATO reacted to Russia’s hybrid actions in Ukraine with its Readiness Action Plan and Adaptation
Measures to reassure the Baltic States and deter Russian adventurism.24 This conventional response
focused almost entirely on land forces and aimed to narrow Russian options for a fait accompli land
grab in the Baltic states. These measures were less effective against the hybrid warfare techniques
Russia demonstrated in Crimea and even offered new opportunities to develop and exploit seams
between NATO allies and Baltic societies.25
In the maritime domain, analysts have responded with recommendations to “deliver a
prescriptive roadmap for establishing a ready posture for top-end warfighting capabilities” to
“contribute to collective defense both in terms of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Specifically,
reinforcement of allies on the European continent will require the establishment and maintenance of
control over sea lines of communication; doing so in A2/AD environments requires increased
capabilities for access and entry.”26 NATO’s reestablishment of Atlantic Command to address
transatlantic reinforcement is of a piece with NATO’s overall focus on deterring overt aggression.

19 “Ukraine Says Russia Looted Two Crimean Oil Rigs,” Reuters (16 December 2015), https://www.reuters.com/

article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-energy-iduskbn0tz22g20151216; FSUOGM - Former Soviet Union Oil & Gas,
“Russian Drilling Rigs Spotted Offshore Ukraine,” Newsbase (3 August 2016), https://newsbase.com/
topstories/russian-drilling-rigs-spotted-offshore-ukraine.
20 “Bortnikov: Kerch Strait Controlled by Russian Special Services,” EurAsia Daily (10 April 2018),
https://eadaily.com/en/news/2018/04/10/bortnikov-kerch-strait-controlled-by-russian-special-services.
21 Andrew Higgins, “Russia Slowly Throttles a Ukrainian Port,” The New York Times (14 December 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/world/europe/moscow-ukraine-azov-mariupol.html; “Russia’s Crimean
Annexation Cost Ukrainian Ports $400M – FT,” The Moscow Times (17 May 2019), https://www.themoscowtimes.com
/2019/05/17/russias-crimean-annexation-cost-ukrainian-ports-400m-ft-a65625.
22 Damir Kaletovic, “Black Sea Incident Risks Russia-Ukraine Conflict Tension,” OilPrice.com (2 February 2017),
https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Black-Sea-Incident-Risks-Russia-Ukraine-ConflictTension.html.
23 Anton Troianovski, “How the World’s Shallowest Sea Became the Latest Flash Point Between Russia and
Ukraine,” The Washington Post (27 November 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/
27/how-worlds-shallowest-sea-became-latest-flashpoint-between-russia-ukraine/; Steven Pifer, “The Battle
for Azov: Round 1 Goes to Russia,” Brookings Institution (3 December 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/03/the-battle-for-azov-round-1-goes-to-russia/.
24 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, ‘Enhanced NATO Air Policing Patrols Baltic Airspace’, 30
January 2015; NATO, ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué ’, 9 July 2016.
25 Marta Kepe, “NATO: Prepared for Countering Disinformation Operations in the Baltic States?” The RAND Blog (7
June 2017), https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/06/nato-prepared-for-countering-disinformation-operations.html;
Teri Schultz, “Russia Is Hacking and Harassing NATO Soldiers, Report Says,” Deutsche Welle (6 October 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/russia-is-hacking-and-harassing-nato-soldiers-report-says/a-40827197; Benas
Gerdziunas, “Baltics Battle Russia in Online Disinformation War,” Deutsche Welle (8 October 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/baltics-battle-russia-in-online-disinformation-war/a-40828834.
26 Steven Horrell, Magnus Nordenman, and Walter B. Slocombe, Updating NATO’s Maritime Strategy
(Washington: Atlantic Council, 2016), page 4.
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These responses make it obvious why Russia and China have adopted hybrid tactics to advance
their interests. The concept of “maritime domain awareness” was promulgated by the U.S. Navy in
2007 in recognition that “non-traditional challenges such as … irregular opponents who employ
asymmetric methods and capabilities” “thriv[e] in the ‘gray zone’ between criminal activity and
armed conflict.”27 “Maritime situational awareness” is mentioned only in passing in NATO’s Maritime
Strategy28 and receives similar levels of attention in most discussions of revising it.29
Yet puncturing the subterfuges utilized in hybrid tactics—utilizing agents and capabilities that
are difficult to attribute to a state actor—is perhaps the primary task in countering them. It is vital
that any claim by a potential aggressor that it had nothing to do with the attack is “dead on arrival.”
NATO made crystal clear at its 2016 Warsaw Summit that any appearance of little green men in the
Baltic states would be met with a strong response by the Alliance.30 There are now centers of
excellence dealing with hybrid warfare (in Helsinki) and cyber security (in Tallinn), but there remains
the requirement to develop specific strategies, concepts of operation, tactics, and practices to counter
hybrid threats in and from the maritime domain.
What would these consist of? Admiral (Ret.) James Stavridis has proposed a number of measures
that could enhance defense capabilities against hybrid maritime threats:
1.

Work with NATO members and partners by encouraging cross talk, exchanging best
practices, and sharing intelligence.

2.

Train and exercise against maritime hybrid warfare, in particular training and education in
rules of engagement, the operation of conventional systems against unconventional forces
at sea, learning to act more like a network at sea in the littoral, and including hybrid scenarios
in international exercises.

3.

Include coast guards and other maritime security forces into yybrid maritime defense
planning. Many coast guard systems and platforms already contain the technologies to
counter maritime hybrid warfare techniques. Therefore, coast guards and coastal forces
should train together. 31

27 Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (Washington: Department of the Navy,
29 May 2007), page 2.
28 NATO Maritime Strategy, paragraph 17.
29 Jeffrey A. Larsen, Time to Face Reality: Priorities for NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit. NATO Defence College
Research Paper No. 126 (Rome: NATO Defence College, January 2016); Spyridon N. Litsas, “Russia in the Eastern
Mediterranean: Intervention, Deterrence, Containment,” Digest of Middle East Studies 26, 1 (2016); Magnus
Nordenman, “Back to the Gap,” The RUSI Journal 162, 1 (January 2017); all contributions to John Andreas Olsen,
editor, NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence (London: Routledge, 2017), except for James
Stavridis, “The United States, The North Atlantic and Maritime Hybrid Warfare”; and all contributors to GabrielFlorin Moissescu, Daniel Dumitru, Sorin Pinzariu, and Iulian Martin, editors, Proceedings of the 11th
International Conference “Strategies XXI”: Technologies—Military applications, Simulations and Resources,
Volume 2 (Bucharest: “Carol I” National Defence University, 5-6 November 2015), including Dragoş-Alexandru
Necula, “Conceptual Delimitations Regarding of Capability Needed to Support Military Effort to Counter Hybrid
War Action.”
30 NATO, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_133169.htm.
31 James Stavridis, “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming,” Proceedings Magazine 142, 12 (December 2016),
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016-12-0/maritime-hybrid-warfare-coming.
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4.

In addition, enhanced Mine Counter Measures (MCM) like the International MCM Exercise
(IMCMEX) of more than 30 nations developed in the Persian Gulf in 2016 could have an
enhanced deterrent effect.32

Our own work has explored an expanded list of potential actions to address this deficit.33 Our
presentation will develop these thoughts further, with concrete proposals for the operational level.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
Hybrid maritime threats pose a considerable problem for naval military planning. They are less
foreseeable and attributable than traditional threats posed by adversary naval forces. Hybrid warfare
at sea can be extremely successful in terms of spoiling the ability of an opponent’s navy to maneuver.
Obliteration of sea lines of communication—especially by mine laying—is a two-edged sword, as it
does not only hinder operations of the attacked party but also has the potential of foiling the
attacker’s ability to maneuver. Hybrid maritime warfare is therefore mainly a destructive tool that
will not help to establish sea control. It is likely to be used by actors with inferior powers compared
to that of the attacked adversary. While most of its techniques are rather conventional (mines,
destruction of cables, etc.), its main novelty is the attempt to hide the origin of the attacker. This can
only be successful in cases short of war. And its success depends on the acceptance of the target
audience of the innocence of the alleged attacker. In the case of Crimea, Russia could not convince the
world that it had nothing to do with the affair. However, in Russia, among its allies, and among a
growing number of populist movements throughout the world, the story of “plausible deniability”
gained considerable credibility. This was good enough to prevent an even stronger international
response to Russia’s blatant aggression. The use of naval forces in Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine
demonstrated how easily regular naval assets can be used in a hybrid maritime scenario.
Future naval warfare will inevitably include hybrid elements. The challenge for modern navies is
to include hybrid maritime threats into exercises, naval academies curricula, and strategic planning.
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CASE STUDY PROPOSAL 8
Testing the Limits of Seapower: Islands, Insurgents, and Interaction
Timothy D. Hoyt, PhD
U.S. Naval War College
Introduction
Seapower provides a unique and ubiquitous advantage, in both peace and war, for those actors who
are able to create and sustain it. In the modern (Westphalian) international system, states able to
exercise sea power effectively gain economic and military benefits, which in turn create and sustain
diplomatic leverage. This synergistic relationship between core elements of state power and their
effective presence on the sea helps explain the outcome of both global and regional wars, the
distribution of power in the international system, and the gradual transition from a mercantilist to a
globalized economy.
The strategic utility of seapower remains a potent force in lesser conflicts, but its ability to affect
those lesser conflicts decisively appears to erode—a phenomenon that deserves further study. If
states exerting seapower effectively tend to win the greatest conflicts, why is it that they have so much
trouble winning smaller ones? Seapower’s relative lack of leverage in irregular warfare presents a
particularly difficult question, both for historical case studies and for current policy debates.
This paper will examine the strengths and limitations of seapower in irregular warfare,
recognizing that there are many other variables that help determine outcomes in those types of
conflicts. It will, in particular, focus at the conceptual level, and the interaction between the strengths
and weaknesses of seapower and insurgents, their preferred strategies, and their points of maximum
strategic effect. In order to focus on the strengths and limits of seapower in irregular warfare, it will
then examine four case studies of irregular warfare on islands—states where seapower would have
a unique ability to shape the battlefield and maximize its relative advantages. These cases will be the
struggle between the government of the United Kingdom and nationalists in Ireland from 1912-1921,
the continuation of that struggle between the government of the United Kingdom and nationalists in
the province of Northern Ireland from 1969-1997, the insurgency on Cuba from 1954-1959, and the
civil war in Sri Lanka from 1980-2009 (this will receive relatively less attention in the symposium
presentation, due to Geoffrey Till’s work).
Relevance of the Topic to the Field of Irregular Maritime Warfare
This case study has a large conceptual component, which should be applicable to the study of any
case involving a sea or naval power and an irregular opponent. Evidence seems to suggest that
seapower has relatively declining effectiveness when wielded in support of internal or irregular
conflicts. The sources of that declining effectiveness may lie in the unique attributes and relative
strategic effects of seapower. It is possible that these are more effective against an asymmetric but
still state-structured continental power than against an asymmetric but weaker state or nonstate
actor. The interaction of relative strengths and weaknesses, and of preferred strategies, may be more
favorable (albeit at much higher cost) in the former case than the latter. This is a problem that is
certainly worthy of investigation.
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Significance of the Topic
Irregular warfare has become endemic to the evolving international system. Formal inter-state
conflict is increasingly rare in the modern world, even though recent U.S. national security documents
urge an increasing focus on the possibility of great power competition and conflict. Most wars in the
international system today are internal wars, waged by a state against elements that opposed the
state for reasons that might include ethnic, sectarian, or religious differences; uneven distribution of
economic resources or political power; strong regional bonds that might lead towards demands for
greater autonomy or outright secession; ideological or revolutionary opposition to existing regimes;
state support from a neighboring power seeking to undermine the existing regime; or other disputes
and factors.
In the 75 years since the end of World War II, great and regional powers with significant naval
capabilities have engaged in irregular warfare and consistently failed to achieve desired political endstates. There are many reasons for this – but the distinction between the explanatory nature of
seapower in major wars and its relative ineffectiveness in smaller conflicts is both important and
significant if, as can be anticipated, states will continue to face internal conflicts alone or with
coalition partners. Understanding the limits of seapower, and the additional burdens that may be
placed on states or coalitions struggling with irregular opponents, will be important if not critical in
creating proper net assessments, strategies, and political endgames in these conflicts.
Research Question
How and why does the unique character of irregular warfare reduce the strategic effectiveness of
seapower?
The approach taken to this question will first examine the principle attributes of seapower (as
outlined by multiple theorists), and its demonstrated effectiveness in struggles against major
continental powers. It will then examine the principle attributes of irregular warfare, as outlined by
various theorists of revolutionary war and insurgency, and outline how interaction between the
principle strengths of each approach may interact in practice. Four case studies will be examined to
look at practice. These case studies will be “island insurgencies,” chosen both because (in theory)
seapower should have maximum impact in a small theater contained by water and also to examine
different types of actors combating the insurgency. The four cases will be Ireland 1912-1921 (civil
war/insurgency within the territory of the leading maritime power), Northern Ireland 1969-1997
(irregular warfare on an island divided by an international border), Cuba 1954-1959 (irregular
warfare on an island subject to great power sea control), and Sri Lanka (civil war on an island with
episodic great power intervention).
Proposed Outline
1. Typology of Wars
a. Great Power/Coalition conflict/competition
b. Regional Wars
c. Internal Wars
2. Attributes and Relative Strengths of Sea Power in Great Power Competitions
a. Theory
b. Practice
3. Reduced Strategic Effectiveness of Sea Power in Regional and Internal Wars
a. Possible explanations
b. Isolating for internal/irregular wars
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4. Attributes and Relative Strengths of Irregular Warfare
a. Theory
b. Practice (selected)
5. Hypotheses
a. Most potent strengths of sea power do not manifest effectively in irregular warfare
b. The character of irregular warfare has changed over time, and that change has reduced
the strategic leverage of sea power
c. The leverage of sea power is NOT significantly different in different types of war
6. Case Studies
a. Ireland 1912-1921 (civil war/insurgency in the territory of a leading sea power)
b. Northern Ireland 1969-1997 (irregular warfare on a divided island)
c. Cuba 1954-1959 (irregular warfare on an island subject to sea control)
d. Sri Lanka 1980-2009 (civil war/irregular warfare with episodic sea control)
7. Analysis and Conclusions
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